Plasmeier

American Studies
Reilly/ Reilly

March 2008

Rubric for Research Paper Assignment

The Assignment: Each student will write a paper based on their own research into a subject of their own choosing, with approval of Dr. Reilly. Your topic can be anything in American history or culture that can be studied through time and that interests you. The paper will be worth 200 points to be included in the fourth marking period. It will be graded on content, organization, and proper grammatical format.

GRADING:

A: Exceeds the standard expectations.

A-/B+

B: Achieves the standard expectations:

This paper must meet the following requirements:

- ✓ a. be seven to ten pages in length;
- ✓ b. states and successfully supports a clear and reasonable thesis;
- ? c. be prepared on a word processor with:
  - ✓ 1) margins set at 1 inch on all sides,
  - ✓ 2) use Times New Roman type,
  - ✓ 3) double-spaced in 12 point font,
  - ✓ 4) include your last name and page number in the top right corner of every page after the first. Do this by creating as header.
  - ✓ 5) footnotes or endnotes prepared in accordance with MLA style,
  - ? 6) and a bibliography prepared in accordance with MLA style;
- ? d. use and cite sources that include:
  - ? 1) at least ~~one monograph~~, Didn't have work by 1 author
  - ✓ 2) at least ~~one reference source~~ found in our library,
  - ✓ 3) at least one primary source,
  - ✓ 4) at least one secondary sources,
  - ? 5) at least one reliable source found through research based on the Internet, which must include at least one source found in a database. Wikipedia will not be acceptable as a cited source because it is not trustworthy.
- ✓ e. be accompanied by a copy of each page cited in your footnotes or endnotes. THIS IS A **"SUDDEN DEATH ERROR"** WHICH WILL RESULT IN A GRADE OF 0. The reason so to encourage you to do your own research and to penalize you for plagiarism. Plagiarism would also have to be reported to the administration and in a letter of recommendation for a college or university.

at least

Paper writing

Describe paste after title but otherwise strong

B-

Showed I could use sources

C: Achieves only four of components of the standard expectations.

F: Achieves only three or less of the components of the standard expectations. There is no opportunity for resubmission.

Summary Comments to explain the grade:

You have written an interesting paper and documented it well. My criticisms primarily are about use of sources; did you use a monograph — a book from the regular collection — and did you use a database. Please tell me about these questions

Over →

Strong title.

Going All Out for War:

The United States Rallying the Home Front

During World War II

Michael Plasmeier
Reilly
American Studies
16 May 2008

Repeat your title here

Your title page is not counted as a numbered page

As the United States entered World War II, the American government needed to make sure the entire country was marching in step with the war effort. The government created the Office of War Information (OWI) to coordinate the propaganda created for Americans. In addition to the government, many private companies reassigned their advertising departments to produce propaganda to help the war effort. These departments focused on increasing production at the nations' firms. In fact, some of the most memorable propaganda, such as *Rosie the Riveter*, was not produced by the government. In Hollywood, the film industry worked with the OWI to produce movies to increase morale and spread information about the war. The goal of most of the propaganda was to mobilize the home front and build support for the war. America's productive capacity was one of the leading factors why America was able to win World War II.

Theirs

Before 1942 the government split the task of providing information to the public between many different agencies: the Office of Facts and Figures, the Office of Government Reports, the Office of Emergency Management's Department of Information, and the Office of Co-Ordinator of Information.[1] On June 13, 1942, Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of War Information to consolidate the different agencies tasked with "disseminat[ing] general public information on the war effort."[2] FDR appointed Elmer Davis to head the new agency. The OWI gathered data and controlled the release of news to the American people, emphasizing the importance of the war and why we needed to win. The agency had an annual budget of $25 million and employed 30,000 people.[3] The OWI coordinated the press, as well as the film and radio industries to provide consistent information about the war to the American people.[4] The agency had two purposes: to glorify the war and to tell Americans why their sacrifices were necessary.[5] At first the agency tried to truthfully represent the war, but later as the war grew ~~direr~~ more dire, the OWI presented more slanted information.

The OWI was not without problems or critics however. Davis had to fight with military leaders who did not like the work the OWI was doing.[6] In addition, many Congressmen thought that the OWI was too pro-Roosevelt, especially with the 1944 election approaching.[7] In 1943, Congress cut the OWI's funding, stopping most of its programs on the home front.[8] After the war, many accused the OWI of harboring Communists, perhaps because of its connection with Hollywood or the fact that Elmer Davis spoke out against McCarthyism.[9]

Save this paragraph for later. Your reader first needs to know what OWI did.

One of the OWI's projects was Frank Capra's series of films called *Why We Fight*. These films give background information on the war and warn about the danger of the imperialistic Axis. The course was designed to be shown to new Army recruits to replace the old and dull "Army Orientation Course."[10] The film was created on a tight budget by putting together footage from captured enemy propaganda, old movies, and newly created animated maps.[11] Capra drew inspiration from the Nazi film *Triumph of Will*.[12] At first, the film was only supposed to be shown to soldiers. However, Roosevelt and Churchill wanted the films to be shown to the general public.[13] The films revolutionized documentary film making and military training methods.[14] For his service, Frank Capra was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal.[15]

What course?

The first film in *Why We Fight*, *Prelude to War* starts out by presenting the United States as the "free world" which has a long history of freedom set by religious and political documents.[16] It then contrasts this with a world of slavery led by a "rabble-rouser," Adolf Hitler, who is out for his own selfish interests.[17] The people in this slave world gave up their individualism to allow their governments to pursue imperialistic pursuits.[18] In addition, the governments of these countries controlled all of the news sources and filled them with propaganda.[19] The film included images of the Nazis defacing churches and children marching

Weak topic sentence.

and saluting Hitler.[20] The film then goes into how America faced the Depression differently than Italy and Germany did.[21] The goal of the film was to differentiate America from the Axis countries and explain the problems with the Axis ideologies.

This would be a better topic sentence for this paragraph.

Wartime posters tried to use the advertising techniques of the time to sell the idea that the factory and home were arenas of war and that the factory workers and families were vital to the war's success.[22] The posters tried to explain to the people why their sacrifices of consumer goods were necessary, as well as try to create a culture which would help the war. For example, the government reminded Americans that "loose lips sink ships," as the enemy was lurking just around the corner.[23] The posters brought the war home, as unlike Britain, the United States themselves, were not bombed or on the front lines.

Posters were used since they were simple and made with silk-screen technology to be quickly reproduced.[24] The WPA even published a handbook, How to Make and Reproduce Posters, which declared that "anyone can make a poster."[25] The posters would be put in places that traditional advertising did not reach, such as schools, factories, offices, and store windows.[26] The OWI even conducted surveys in factories to test worker's impressions of new posters.[27]

Private firms also made posters, even outnumbering the amount of official government-issued posters.[28] Manufactures used posters and the war effort to get employees to "suspend union rules, abandon traditional work patterns, and make sacrifices in the name of patriotism."[29] S. D. Warren Company even published a catalog of posters that they sold to business to encourage workers to increase production.[30] The government also urged "joint labor-management coordinating committees" to work together to increase morale and to resolve issues between labor and management.[31] General Motor's poster "Together We Can Do It" exemplifies this.[32] The posters also tried to paint workers as "production soldiers," for example in "Wear it

What? Help your reader understand.

Proudly."[33] Some posters encouraged workers to ask their supervisors if the had any questions ("Any Questions about York Work? Ask Your Supervisor!").[34] Others suggested that wasting time was hurting Americans ("Killing Time Is Killing Men").[35] All of the posters tried to get Americans to work harder and longer at their jobs, in order to support the war effort.

One of the most well-known symbols during the war was Rosie the Riveter. One of the most recognizable posters of "Rosie" was, and still is today, *We Can Do It!* by J. Howard Miller for the Westinghouse War Production Co-Ordinating Committee.[36] Rosie made it seem patriotic for women to work outside the house.[37] Women filled the jobs of men who left to fight the war.[38] With the help of the Rosie images, more than 6 million women joined the workforce.[39] After the war, Rosie became a symbol of feminism and women's economic roles in the workplace.

You need to describe this poster in a sentence.

Be consistent in your style of treating titles.

Posters frequently used stereotypical images of the enemy giving instructions to workers telling them to work slower.[40] For example in "Thanks for Loafing, Pal!," Hitler thanks an American worker for slacking.[41] These posters tried to get Americans to reject this possibility by working harder.

Posters also idolized America's streets, families, optimism, and standards of living.[42] These posters tried to remind Americans what they were fighting for.

Examples? This is a topic sentence in search of a paragraph

Others tried to show the grim realities of a war at home. For example, "Dear God, Keep Them Safe!" by the Kroger Grocery and Baking Company shows two school children wearing gas masks.[43] These posters attempted to get workers to work harder to avoid this possibility.

However the design of posters was not free of conflict. Two groups at the OWI clashed over the design of posters. One group liked the "war art" style featuring stylized symbols and images.[44] Francis Brennan, who was the former art director of *Fortune Magazine*, wanted

posters to combine the sophisticated style of contemporary art with the promotion of war aims.[45] For example, "Strong in the Strength of the Lord," used artwork combined with an abstract message of supporting "the cause".[46] Another group, which had worked in the advertising industry, wanted the government's posters to resemble advertisements. These posters tried to combine the messages of sacrifice with the smiling faces and carefree households found in advertising.[47] In the United States, the advertisement style was seen more often.

Describe.

The government also sought to control Hollywood and the movie industry. Before the war, the government was trying to get Hollywood to cut back on the interventionalist tone of movies, since the US government was trying to play an isolationist role.[48] However after the war started, the OWI guided the movie industry in glorifying the war, the men who served in it, and the American home front which supported the troops.[49] The OWI created the Bureau of Motion Pictures (BMP) which had offices in Washington, D.C., New York and Los Angeles.[50]

At the start of the war, the OWI asked filmmakers to think about 7 questions as they made movies:

- Will this picture help win the war?
- What war information problem does it seek to clarify, dramatize, or interpret?
- If it is an "escape" picture, will it harm the war effort by creating a false picture of America, her allies, or the world we live in?
- Does it merely use the war as the basis for a profitable picture, contributing nothing of real significance to the war effort and possibly lessening the effect of other pictures of more importance?
- Does it contribute something new to our understanding of the world conflict and the various forces involved, or has the subject already been adequately covered?

- When the picture reaches its maximum circulation on the screen, will it reflect conditions as they are and fill a need current at that time, or will it be out-dated?
- Does the picture tell the truth or will the young people of today have reason to say they were misled by propaganda?[51]

The OWI at the start of the war wanted to represent the war truthfully.[52] Thus, the last question was important for them.[53] However, as the war became bogged down, the OWI instructed Hollywood to produce more symbolic and one-sided films.[54] The BMP reviewed over 1,650 movie scripts during the war.[55] Their recommendations ranged from adding a few lines of inspirational dialogue to recommending that the movie be withheld until after the war.[56]

Hollywood also helped to boost morale in America with movies portraying idealistic middle class families who managed well through the pressures of family, working, and rations.[57] Movies such as *Joe Smith, American* portrayed hardworking Americans doing their duty by working and not leaking secrets to the enemy. [58]

Hollywood produced light-hearted song and dance movies to get American's mind off of the war, at least for the length of the movie.[59] Such movies include *Holiday Inn*, and *Stage Door Canteen*.[60] Other movies also helped Americans remember what they were fighting for with nostalgia films portraying turn-of-the century life.[61] *Meet Me In St. Louis* and *Life With Father* serve as examples of these films.[62]

Americans in the Gilded Age followed Hollywood celebrities and yearned to be like them. Hollywood celebrities supported the war by putting on USO shows, or even enlisting in the military themselves.[63] Others appeared in advertisements and publicity tours to sell war bonds and promote scrap drives.[64]

The BMP also produced documentary films for showings at schools, churches, and other community venues.[65] Films like *Why We Fight* and the *Autobiography of a Jeep* explained the war effort to the American people and got them to connect with it.[66] The OWI also produced 52 short films as part of the *American Speaks* series.[67] About half of the films were written by OWI staff, while Hollywood screenwriters wrote the other half.[68] By January of 1943, 4.7 million people had watched 31,000 showings of BWI films.[69]

In order to save food for the troops, and keep prices down, the government encouraged people to plant "victory gardens."[70] Victory gardens were vegetable gardens planted in people's backyards, vacant lots, parks, schoolyards, and even baseball fields.[71] Almost 20 million Americans were involved in the maintenance of a victory garden, and the gardens produced up to 40% of the food Americans consumed.[72] In order to encouraging the planting of victory gardens, the OWI printed posters encouraging victory gardening.[73] These posters presented gardening as a communal affair and a civic duty.[74] In addition, magazines like *Good Housekeeping* and *Better Home & Gardens*, seed companies, and the government published pamphlets and instruction manuals to help those who had no experience with gardening.[75] A good sized garden was supposed to feed a family for the summer, with the excess canned using home canning equipment for the winter.[76]

During World War II, the government and private industry went all out for the war. They organized information campaigns in order to maximize production of needed war goods and minimize the home front's use of goods. In addition, the campaigns told Americans why they were fighting and kept morale up by providing distractions. They reminded the people of what would happen if America lost the war or had to fight it at home. They provided this information through a variety of mediums, most notably posters and movies. However, the information

campaigns did not last long. Many were shut down or curtailed as the US was winning the war because Congress did not like how close the government or industry was working together or thought that the advertisements were too political. In all, the propaganda helped the American home front be one of the most productive of the war, allowing America and its allies to defeat the Axis powers.

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Posters from National Museum of American History, Smithsonian Institution, and the Smithsonian Institution Traveling Exhibition Service' exhibit *Posters on the American Home Front (1941-45)*

		**"Come on, Gang! We're Building Arms for Victory!"** (Pontiac Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, 1942. Gift of S.D. Warren Company, Poster, cat. 163991.11, 30"w x 40"h, cs91-14109)
		**"It Can Happen Here!"** (Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation, 1942 Gift of Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation. Poster, cat.164371.25, 30"w x 40"h, 91-10321)
		**"You're Darn Tootin' We'll Keep 'em Shootin'"** (Ordnance Department, U.S. Army, 1942 Gift of War Department, Services of Supply, Poster, cat.163676.06, 28 1/2" x 40" 91-14108)
		**"Buy a Share in America"** (Artist: John C. Atherton, U.S. Treasury, 1941. Poster 303735.37, 20" x 28" 91-16228. Gift of the Peabody Museum)

	**"Keep Us Flying!"** (U.S. Treasury, 1943 Poster 1985. 0776.04, 20" x 28" 91-16230. Gift of Leon A. Watkins.)
	**"Train to Be a Nurse's Aide"** (New York City WPA War Service, 1942. Subway card, 21" x 11" 90-3541, 163786.08)
	**"Remember Pearl Harbor / Purl Harder"** (New York City WPA War Service, 1942 Poster, 163786.02, 14" x 22 1/4", 90-3535. Gift of New York City WPA War Service.)
	**"Grow it Yourself"** (Artist: Herbert Bayer, Rural Electrification Administration, U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1942. Poster, 163786.01, 31" x 21 1/8", 90-3534. Gift of New York City WPA War Service.)
	**"Battle Stations!"** (Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corporation, 1942 Poster, 164393.03, 31" x 41" 90-460. Gift of Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corporation.)

	**"More....Production"** (General Cable Corporation, 1942, Poster, 164976.01, 30" x 39" 91-14111. Gift of General Cable Corporation.)
	(Photo, S.D. Warren Company, Posters Used by American Industries as War Production Incentives, 1942. 93-2129)
	(Photo, b&w, S.D. Warren Company, "The colorful poster campaign...", p. 6, 93-2127 Courtesy S.D. Warren Company.)
	**"Get Hot / Keep Moving"** (Unattributed. Poster, 163991.09, 28" x 40", 93-2318 Gift of S.D. Warren Company.)

	**"It's a Two Fisted Fight"** (Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corporation. Poster, 164393.07, 31" x 41", 91-10320, 1942, Gift of Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corporation.)
	**"Together We Can Do It"** (Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation, 1942 Poster, 164371.43, 30" x 40", 91-10322. Gift of Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation.)
	**"Wear It Proudly"** (Magill-Weinsheimer Company, 1942. Poster, 303735.20, 28" x 38", 91-14113. Gift of Peabody Museum.)
	**"We Can Do It!"** (Artist: J. Howard Miller, Westinghouse War Production Co-Ordinating Committee. Poster, 1985.0851.05, 17" x 22", 87-13107)

	**"Any Questions about York Work? Ask Your Supervisor!"** (Artist: J. Howard Miller, Westinghouse Labor-Management Co-Ordinating Committee. Poster, 1985.0851.38, 17" x 22", 91-2543. Purchase.)
	**"Kiling Time Is Killing Men"** (Artist: Reynold Brown, North American Aviation, 1943. Poster, 164814.01, 32 1/2 x 42 1/2", 91-14114. Gift of North American Aviation.)
	(Photo/cover, Steel Horizons, 2 pp., spread, posters, 93-2128)
	**"We've never seen anything like it."** (Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation, Steel Horizons, 1942, On the "flood" of production incentive posters. Courtesy National Process Company.)
	**"Don't Be a Bottleneck / Beat the Promise"** (Radio Corporation of America. Poster, 164349.05, 18" x 22", 91-16238. Gift of RCA Manufacturing Company.)

		**"Thanks for Loafing, Pal!"** (Walter Kidde & Company, Poster, 164560.11, 17 x 23", 91-16239. Gift of Walter Kidde & Company.)
		**"Never Late Is Better"** (Walter Kidde & Company Poster, 164560.13, 17 x 23", 91-16240)
		**"Are You Doing All You Can?"** (General Cable Corporation, 1942. Poster, 164976.03, 22 x 28", 91-16242. Gift of General Cable Corporation.)
		**"The Sound That Kills"** (U.S. Office of War Information, Poster No. 1, 1942 Poster, 164595.03, 14 1/4 x 20", 91-16249. Gift of Bureau of Publications and Graphics, U.S. Office of War Information.)

	**"Strong in the Strength of the Lord"** (Artist: David Stone Martin, U.S. Office of War Information Poster No. 8, 1942 Poster, 164238.02, 22 x 28", 88-10638. Gift of Bureau of Publications and Graphics, U.S. Office of War Information.)
	**"We'll Have Lots to Eat This Winter, Won't We, Mother?"** (Artist: Al Parker, U.S. Office of War Information Poster No. 57. Poster, 1984.0473.042, 16 x 22 1/2", 87-8757. Purchase.)
	**"He's Watching You"** (Division of Information, Office for Emergency Management, 1942. Poster, 163677.01, 28 1/2 x 40", 91-10319. Gift of War Department Bureau of Public Relations.)
	**"Give 'em Both Barrels"** (Artist: Jean Carlu, Division of Information, Office for Emergency Management, 1942. Poster, 63958.01, 40 x 30", 91-13868. Gift of Harris, Seybold, Potter Company.)

	**"Help Bring Them Back to You!** **...Make Yours a Victory Home!"** (Artist: Criss, U.S. Office of War Information Poster No. 41, 1943 Poster, 1984.0473.039, 21 x 28". Purchase.)
	**"This is America....where the family is a sacred institution..."** (Photo, 91-1541. Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)
	**"This is America... smile, man, smile"** (Photograph by John Vachon. Photo 91-16227. Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company)
	**"This is America...where Main Street is bigger than Broadway..."** (Photograph by Walker Evans, 91-2541. Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)

	**"This is America...where a man picks his job"** (Photograph by Korth, 91-16226. Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)
	**"Keep 'em Rolling, Pal...Produce for Victory"** (Photograph by Otto Hagel, 91-16246, 163799.03 24 x 36". Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)
	**"Man for Man...Produce for Victory!"** (Photograph courtesy Newsweek Magazine. 91-2748, 63799.15, 24 x 36". Gift of Sheldon- Claire Company.)
	**"Dear God, Keep Them Safe!"** (Kroger Grocery and Baking Company. Poster, 164204.04, 48 x 36", 90-3773. Gift of Kroger Grocery and Baking Company.)

		**"Don't Let Anything Happen to Them!"** (Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation Poster, 164371.37, 30 x 40", 1942. Gift of Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation.)
		**"Make Today a Safe Day"** (Artist: J. Howard Miller, Westinghouse Headquarters Industrial Relations Poster, 1985.0851.26, 17 x 22, 91-2539. Purchase.)
		**"Make This Pledge"** (Attributed to U.S. Office of Economic Stabilization. Poster, 1984.0473.068, 20 x 28 1/2", 91-2544. Purchase.)
		**"Despite War Restrictions, America's Living Standard...."** (Unattributed. Poster, 1989.0674, 20 x 27", 91-2454. Purchase.)

		**"This is America...a nation with more homes"** (Sheldon Claire Company. Poster, 167134.05, 24 x 36", 91-2540. Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)

Marshall Cavendish

This page: *The distinctive Kukryniksy style compared with similar efforts abroad.*

◁ *Stockholm's* Sondagnisse Strix *shows Himmler and Goebbels keeping a tight hold on "General Scapegoat"–keeping him in reserve for when the Führer's intuition results in a defeat.*

▽ ◁ *Kukryniksy* par excellence. *Goebbels shrilly claims more smashing victories in Russia. And a wooden echo from the row of coffined Wehrmacht troops adds: "We hope for more successes in the future . . ."*

▽ *Bance Russell of the* New York Post *adopts the simian look for his version of Goebbels.*

▷ *Before the Non-Aggression Pact: capitalism, fond godfathers of Nazism–France, Britain, Wall Street, and the industrial magnates of the Ruhr.*

▷▽ *Munich time, 1938: the dictators and the appeasers.*



RUSSIA: savage and hard-hitting

When Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Russian propagandists had to make a swift about-turn. Ever since the Non-Aggression Pact of 1939 they had been following the Molotov line: war with Germany was contrary to the mutual interests of the two countries. Operation "Barbarossa" put an abrupt end to that.

The savagery with which the Russian propagandists fell upon the invading "Hitlerite hordes" was a faithful by-product of the Russo-German war; but in many ways the Russian technique had been foreshadowed. One of the most obvious examples was the caricaturists' treatment of the Nazi leaders–Hitler the villain of the piece, the wolf in sheep's clothing with dripping fangs; Himmler with his headsman's axe; Goebbels wizened, monkey-like (with or without tail, according to choice). There are two fair examples of this general similarity on the opposite page, one from Stockholm and one from America.

One of the key principles of modern propaganda was summed up by Lewis Carroll's Humpty Dumpty in *Alice:* "When *I* use a word it means exactly what I intend it to mean; neither more nor less." And nowhere was this more true than in the original Soviet propaganda before the Ribbentrop pact of 1939. Russian propaganda in the 1930s screamed of the growing menace of Nazidom and the cowardice of the Western democracies in failing to tackle the Axis dictators head-on.

In the first months of the German invasion there was all too little for Russian propagandists to cheer about. Bedrock appeals to Russian nationalism–"The Motherland Calls!"–were ranged beside hard-hitting criticism of Nazi brutality. An early theme to emerge from the Kukryniksy team of caricaturists was "the training of Fritz"–a Nazi boyhood, from torturing cats as a young boy, beating up old folk in the Hitler Youth, and finally emerging with his blood-spattered ceremonial axe, all ready for service in Russia.

Then came Moscow in December 1941, and a clear-cut victory. At once a theme emerged which would remain a constant standby: the theme of Russian might, represented by a gigantic pair of pincers carving deep into the emaciated German lines, or a massive, monolithic tank.

After Stalingrad came another new style. This was the personification of the Red Army soldier: a young giant with a stern and vengeful expression, sweeping the Germans before him with a broom made of bayonets. It was a fair reflection of the deliberate glorification of the Red Army in the post-Stalingrad era, when the long chain of victories began.

Stalin's propagandists were also quick to exploit the many sieges of Russian capitals and provincial centres – Odessa, Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, Sevastopol'. As with the British victims of the Blitz, this identified the urban population with the front-line troops, with battle honours of their own of which they could be proud.

However, as the war progressed the British developed considerable skill in the field of "black" propaganda. As opposed to "white" propaganda–the traditional medium–"black" propaganda had a subtlety which often bordered on the fiendish. One form was the "*Kreisleiter* letter". German parents would receive a fake document regretfully informing them that their son had been killed in action on such and such a day, and that his personal effects had been forwarded home to his local *Kreisleiter*. Naturally the *Kreisleiter*, when approached, would know nothing about the dead soldier's possessions. It was an ingenious way of using enemy battle casualties to undermine faith in the Nazi régime.

Then there was *Soldatensender Calais*, a broadcasting station aimed at the German troops in Western Europe. This was put to good use before and after D-Day, undermining German morale with grim warnings of what was coming and depressing news of what the continuation of the war was doing to their homes. *Soldatensender Calais* used tough

soldier's jargon and pulled no punches. It was obviously a foreign station–that was the point.

It must be concluded that the "black" approaches proved to be the most skilful refinement of British propaganda. In the more conventional media, the British technique always seems to have been too polite.

△ *Axis subtlety: the "Big Three" alliance corroded by the American dollar, for the benefit of the occupied French.*
△▷ *British sobriety: once again, the direct approach.*
▷ *A blast from the British Communist Party–with the Red Army coming off second best to trades union rights and the* Daily Worker.

The Mediterranean Invasion. British troops, tanks guns pouring ashore from landing craft.

VICTORY OF THE ALLIES IS ASSURED

THE RED ARMY's Fight is YOUR Fight!

The Communist Party says **ACT NOW!**

★ *Remove Pro-fascists from high places*





The German recovery after Stalingrad inspired a natural note of caution among the Russian propagandists; but then came Kursk, the turning-point on the Eastern Front, and the era of the massed "victory salutes" in Moscow began. But the image of the "Nazi beast" remained, and there were two obvious reasons for this. The first was the discovery of German atrocities in the territories liberated by the Red Army; the second was the tenacity of the Wehrmacht in defence, which grew ever more ferocious as it fell back on the frontiers of the Reich.

These two factors inspired the notorious "hate propaganda" of Ilya Ehrenburg. "We cannot live as long as these grey-green slugs are alive. Today there are no books; today there are no stars in the sky; today there is only one thought: Kill the Germans. Kill them all and dig them into the earth." And again: "We are remembering everything. Now we know. The Germans are not human. Now the word 'German' has become the most terrible swear-word. Let us not speak. Let us not be indignant. Let us kill . . . If you have killed one German, kill another. There is nothing jollier than German corpses."

Ehrenburg's "hate propaganda" was maintained at red-hot intensity right through to the spring of 1945. As the invasion of the Reich proceeded he was writing: "The Fritzes are still running, but not lying dead. Who can stop us now? General Model? The Oder? The Volkssturm? No, it's too late. Germany, you can now whirl round in circles, and burn, and howl in your deathly agony; the hour of revenge has struck!" But by April 1945 it was increasingly obvious that "hate propaganda" was out of date in view of Germany's imminent collapse and the post-war problems of administering the occupied sectors of the Reich; and Ehrenburg was abruptly muzzled. His "hate propaganda" had served its turn; now it was not only outdated but a positive embarrassment.

As the string of Russian victories lengthened, ridicule began to emerge more and more in Russian posters and cartoons. The Nazi beast tended to give place to the tattered scarecrow, emaciated, ridiculous, but never quite pathetic.

Being as it was the product of a totalitarian state, Russian propaganda was manipulated with stone-faced cynicism and little scope was given to individual viewpoints. The "official line" remained all-important. Yet Russian propaganda never lost its edge. Right to the end it remained ruthless and hard-hitting, with a style all its own. From the months of defeat to final victory, these characteristics remained.

△ △ "The Nazi beast aboard his tank"–standard Kukryniksy view of the German invaders down to Stalingrad.
△ "The tired old organ-grinder takes to the road"–ridicule takes over. Hitler shambles from the scene with Mussolini and Rumania's Antonescu as his performing monkeys.
▷ Moscow, 1941–and the first genuine note of confidence. Russia's field army is portrayed as an invincible pair of pincers. The same motif would be repeated many times when other sieges were raised–most notably in the case of Leningrad, with vengeful swords slicing through the shrinking German arms encircling the city.
▷ ▷ "The Führer is beside himself"–derisive Kukryniksy jibe at the shaky relations between the Führer and his commanding generals. The surrenders at Stalingrad gave the Russians plenty of opportunities to weigh up these weaknesses for themselves.

BRITAIN: the straight-faced look

British propaganda stands out in total contrast with the Russian style. For this there are many reasons. The first is the basic uncertainty with which Britain went to war, an uncertainty compounded by the months of "Phoney War". Clearly Nazism was to be destroyed, and this programme was always confidently featured. Much more important, however, was the fact that Britain was quite unready for war; hence the dominant stream of poster campaigns aimed at getting the country onto a war footing by urging economies of every sort in the home.

The Blitz gave British propaganda its first genuine boost. Now the war was being brought home to the British people in a new and hateful way: anonymously and impartially, by the bomber. The British may not have had the Nazi invader on their soil, enslaving and torturing; but they did have "Firebomb Fritz" and the bombing of Coventry. The same applied to the German U-boat offensive in the Atlantic, which triggered off many a "Careless Talk" campaign as well as representing the German submariners as cowardly assassins.

Nevertheless the British war effort remained essentially insular. Even the intense campaigns aimed at whipping up support for Russia after the German invasion in 1941 were aimed largely at exploiting socialist and working-class enthusiasm in the factory. "Tanks for Russia" was typical.

In the leaflet war against German civilians and servicemen the British approach remained generally naïve. The trouble here was that until the end of 1942 the Germans were obviously winning the war, and even in 1943 it was far from obvious that they were going to lose it. Sir David Hunt, with the 8th Army, has commented on the difficulties that propagandists encountered in the field. "They were hampered a little by the fact that their only means of delivering pamphlets was to replace with them the smoke cartridge of a 25-pounder, base-ejection smoke shell. This meant that the inspiring and carefully-chosen words had to be squashed on to a round piece of paper just a little over three inches in diameter and with a circular hole in the middle. So far as I remember the most that space allowed was something like this: 'Dear Germans–why not stop fighting? We will really treat you quite well.'"

Not surprisingly, they failed.

▽ *Drab reality: the typical appearance of British war-time propaganda, hardly redolent of a crusade for the rights and freedom of mankind.*
▷ *Before the "Phoney War" removed the gloves: bold type and bald message.*

leas for Co-Prosperity

athetic attempt to justify 's "Runaway Victory" in es of her victims. Even the oast of the "New Order rope" carried more tion.

There was always a note of naïveté about Japanese propaganda. It was reflected in the cosy title which the Japanese gave to their conquests in South-East Asia and the Pacific: the "South-East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere", suggestive of a giant co-operative friendly society. It did not fit in with the brutal reality of Japanese military occupation. The trouble was that the reason for the sudden expansion of the Japanese Empire was painfully obvious: exploitation.

During the battle for the Philippines in 1941-42, the Japanese issued a crude, line-drawn leaflet showing a genial Japanese soldier giving a cigarette to a battered-looking Filipino soldier. In the background American troops can be seen running away, carrying a ripped and tattered American flag. "You are our pals," announced the legend. Our enemies are the Americans." Simple efforts such as this, and rhyming tags like the example below (more appropriate to a nursery school wall than an international propaganda campaign) had little chance. They certainly did not prevent the Filipino resistance movement from becoming one of the most powerful subversive elements in the entire "Co-Prosperity Sphere".

Primary education pamphlets were issued in Tokyo in series with titles like "The Schools Weekly, Primer Edition", and "The A.B.C. Weekly". A typical, run of the mill example read as follows:

"We have a new *Ministry*. It is the *Greater East Asia Ministry*.

"Mr. Kazuo Aoki is the *Minister* of the new Ministry."

Then, accompanying a photograph of prisoners from the "Doolittle Raid" on Tokyo: "Here you see some American *airmen*.

"They are the crew of the American planes which *raided* Japan on April 18.

"They have been *punished with heavy penalties*.

"The crew of any aircraft raiding Japan will be punished *with death*."

An Anglo-Japanese translation key follows.

In general, Japan's propaganda efforts always retained the amateur look of a back-streets printer. They never made the most out of the formidable achievements born of the months of victory, or whipped up any effective anti-British feeling.



◁ and ▽ Match-box label propaganda was widely used by the Japanese. Colourfully printed, extolling Japanese military might, and ridiculing the British, Americans, and Chinese, they were sold "over the counter" and were often solemnly dropped on Allied airfields as well.




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Just how effective was the propaganda of World War II?

Webster's International Dictionary defines "propaganda" as "any systematic, widespread dissemination or promotion of particular ideas, doctrines, practices, etc., to further one's own cause or to damage an opposing one". And as far as war-time propaganda is concerned certain generalisations have to be considered.

First, propaganda of any kind has singularly little effect on the enemy when he happens to be winning. But this obvious fact is compounded by other factors. The Japanese were a case in point. The loyalty of their rank and file was proverbial; surrender or capture spelled unthinkable disgrace. Nothing proved this more clearly than the jungle fugitives on Guam in the Marianas islands who refused to accept that Japan had surrendered and held out against the day when the Japanese Army would return. These men continued to be rounded up long after 1945, one of them holding out until 1972. They belonged to an army which had been told that only torture and death awaited them at the hands of the Americans; but far more effective was the Japanese soldier's instinctive, unshakeable loyalty to his Emperor.

Similarly, German S.S. troops were also generally impervious to Allied propaganda, but this was not unique to the S.S. The best example was to be found in the Luftwaffe airborne units, which proved themselves tough and determined fighters from their early triumphs, right through the North African and Italian campaigns, with a fighting tradition and pride in their unit second to none.

The records show that only 59 British P.O.W.s responded to the call of the "Crusade Against Bolshevism" and enlisted in the *Waffen*-S.S. German recruiting propaganda had much greater success on the Eastern Front–but there the situation was different because of the wider array of minority nationalities: Latvians, Ukrainians, Cossacks, etc. In fact, one of the last actions of the war in Europe was a cavalry attack by a Cossack unit fighting with the Germans in northern Italy.

Awareness of victory, then, plus nationalist pride and military tradition, created a formidable shell for propaganda to crack. But – paradoxically – World War II produced plenty of cases where the reverse did not hold true in defeat. The population of besieged Warsaw in September 1939; the Finns during the "Winter War" of 1939-40; the British under the shadow of invasion and the perils of the Blitz in 1940; the endurance of the Leningraders during their 30-month siege: all were apparently hopeless situations in which propaganda appeals by the enemy had little or no effect.

The same applied to the fighting men. The British Guards held out at "Knightsbridge" in the Battle of Gazala–because they were the Guards. Four months later the Italo-German *Panzerarmee* and *Afrika Korps* fought on long after any reasonable hope of victory had evaporated. Similarly, the stand of the German paratroops at Cassino was later mirrored by that of the British 1st Airborne Division at Arnhem. And the hopeless defence of Iwo Jima in 1945 by General Kuribayashi's Japanese surpassed all these examples. While radio contact with Japan remained, Kuribayashi's messages reflected nothing but regret at having let the Americans establish themselves on Imperial Japanese territory.

It has often been claimed that the French collapse in 1940 was largely the result of months of eroding propaganda. There was certainly an intense propaganda campaign during the "Phoney War" while the French and German armies watched each other across the No-Man's Land between the Maginot and Siegfried Lines. Huge loudspeakers hurled messages backwards and forwards and leaflets were scattered lavishly. But on at least one occasion German attempts to sap the morale of the Maginot Line garrisons broke down in farce. A huge German placard appeared one morning, informing the French "Soldiers of the North" that their wives and girl friends were being unfaithful back home. The French troops at whom this was aimed riposted with a placard of their own: "We don't give a damn–we're from the south!" The truth of the matter is that the propaganda which did the most damage to French morale before the catastrophe of 1940 was not German, but Communist; Communist subversion and agitation had been rife in France long before the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1939.

When all is said and done, propaganda aims at the mind; and war-time propaganda could be described as a form of mental tear gas to prevent the enemy from doing his job as effectively as he might otherwise have done. In war-time conditions, propaganda aimed at one's own population tends to pall after a while–people get tired of being exhorted. But it is nevertheless essential, for morale; a good parallel is the anti-aircraft barrage during the London Blitz. The damage done by the A.A. guns to the German bombers was negligible; but the Londoners found that air raids were far more bearable when they knew that their own guns were replying to the thunder of enemy bombs.

Conversely, the German people proved that even when the news is uniformly bad and official propaganda manifestly untrue, the general reaction is one of cynical humour, never of confusion and despair.

◁ ◁ *Familiar images used to ram home a principle of war-time security precautions.*

▽ *Simple, cartoon treatment–and an easy-to-remember rhyming slogan.*



Like Napoleon, Hitler was a master of the big lie; and one of the biggest lies produced by the propaganda machine of the Third Reich was the "crusade against Bolshevism for the New Europe" line. Unfortunately this took some little time to emerge. Until 1940 Goebbels and his copywriters concentrated their efforts against individual victims–the Czechs, the Poles, the French, the British. Not until the invasion of Russia did the "crusade against Bolshevism" take shape. Once established, however, it remained–particularly when the Eastern Front began to be beaten back towards the Reich.

Joachim Peiper, the *Waffen*-S.S. commander who narrowly escaped hanging for his responsibility for the deliberate murder of American prisoners during the Battle of the Bulge in December 1944, was one among thousands who believed in the "New Europe" dream. Seven years after the end of the war, he wrote to his former comrades: "Don't forget that it was in the ranks of the S.S. that the first European died."

Here, for a certainty, Nazi propaganda had won a lasting victory . . .



▷▷ *This poster shows a resurgent France bursting out of the bonds of German occupation with the help of her British and American allies.*

▷ *An ever-recurring theme in German propaganda: the German soldier as the champion of European freedom.*

▽ *To win over Russians to the side of their German "liberators"–the horrors of Bolshevism compared with the brave new world for which the Third Reich was fighting the war.*


A la France éternelle
ses amis, ses alliés

Every Citizen a Soldier

Addressing every citizen as a combatant in the war of production, wartime posters united the power of art with the power of advertising to sell the idea that the factory and the home were also arenas of war. Poster campaigns aimed not only to increase productivity in factories, but also to enlarge people's views of their responsibilities in a time of total war.

Wartime posters were conceived as a visual call to arms. According to poster designers, posters should be to the eye what a shouted command is to the ear.

"Come on, Gang! We're Building Arms for Victory!"
(Pontiac Motor Division, General Motors Corporation, 1942.
Gift of S.D. Warren Company,
Poster, cat. 163991.11, 30"w x 40"h, cs91-14109)

Some poster designs aimed at making the war personal by raising the grim possibility of war extending to one's own backyard.

"It Can Happen Here!"
(Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation, 1942
Gift of Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation.
Poster, cat.164371.25, 30"w x 40"h, 91-10321)

In the early 1940s, posters were most usually seen in the form of 24-sheet billboards. By contrast, single-sheet war posters were small. Government planners felt that this was an advantage: the novelty of

size and placement would make single-sheet posters noticeable.



"You're Darn Tootin' We'll Keep 'em Shootin'"
(Ordnance Department, U.S. Army, 1942
Gift of War Department, Services of Supply,
Poster, cat.163676.06, 28 1/2" x 40" 91-14108)

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☆The Poster's Place in Wartime

During the First World War, posters were the primary form of public communication; but by 1940 posters had been supplanted by radio, movies, and billboards. Why then did government and private industry turn to posters to rally the public in World War II?

First, people would encounter posters in places that other media couldn't reach--schools, factories, offices, store windows, and other places outside the scope of paid advertising. Second, posters had democratic appeal--they could be made by anyone; they could be seen by all. Both medium and message spoke of democracy, which made posters ideal for expressing American war aims: why we fight, what we fight for. For example, artist John C. Atherton's first-prize poster for Defense Bonds was painted on a 48-foot billboard at one of New York's busiest street corners, 42nd Street and Fifth Avenue, July 1941.

To tap the creative energies of American artists, the Museum of Modern Art organized a National Defense Poster Competition in 1941. The contest was sponsored by the museum and two of the government's largest users of posters, the Army Air Corps and the Treasury Department. First prize in the Defense Bond category was won by John C. Atherton, a prominent commercial artist. Atherton's winning design--showing the factory as the front line of decisive action -- was echoed in other posters as America entered the war after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941.

"Buy a Share in America"
(Artist: John C. Atherton, U.S. Treasury, 1941.
Poster 303735.37, 20" x 28" 91-16228.
Gift of the Peabody Museum)

The Treasury Department financed the war through the sale of bonds and stamps to the public. War bond posters called upon all citizens to share in "ownership" of the war. This poster depicts one of the elite corps of airmen trained at the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama.

"Keep Us Flying!"
(U.S. Treasury, 1943 Poster 1985.
0776.04, 20" x 28" 91-16230.
Gift of Leon A. Watkins.)

In the late 1930s, artists of the government - sponsored Works Progress Administration (WPA) pioneered silk- screen techniques that simplified the serial production of colorful poster images. The WPA handbook How to Make and Reproduce Posters (1943) promoted poster-making as a democratic activity, declaring "Anyone can make a poster."

"Train to Be a Nurse's Aide"
(New York City WPA War Service, 1942.
Subway card, 21" x 11" 90-3541, 163786.08)

"Remember Pearl Harbor / Purl Harder"
(New York City WPA War Service, 1942
Poster, 163786.02, 14" x 22 1/4", 90-3535.
Gift of New York City WPA War Service.)

Posters encouraged all citizens to participate in the war effort in every possible way -- growing, conserving, saving, Tproducing.

"Grow it Yourself"
(Artist: Herbert Bayer, Rural Electrification Administration,
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 1942.
Poster, 163786.01, 31" x 21 1/8", 90-3534.
Gift of New York City WPA War Service.)

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Retooling for Victory: The Factory Front

The 1930s had been an era of violent labor disputes. Now the war emergency demanded a change in American industry--not only a switch from consumer goods to war materiel, but also a change in workers' and managers' attitudes from antagonism to cooperation. The government launched a campaign urging workers to make personal sacrifices to win the war, and individual businesses and labor unions quickly followed suit. Eventually, privately produced posters vastly outnumbered official government-issued posters.

For manufacturers, the war was an opportunity to gain greater control over their work force. In the push for increased productivity, factory managers called for employees to suspend union rules, abandon traditional work patterns, and make sacrifices in the name of patriotism.

Government agencies offered tips on the design and placement of posters in the factory, urging employers to "use enough" -- at least one poster per 100 workers. Plant managers, company artists, paper manufacturers, and others needed little encouragement to carry out this advice; private industry produced vast numbers of production-incentive posters during the war.

"Battle Stations!"
(Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corporation, 1942
Poster, 164393.03, 31" x 41" 90-460.
Gift of Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corporation.)



"More....Production"
(General Cable Corporation, 1942,

Poster, 164976.01, 30" x 39" 91-14111.
Gift of General Cable Corporation.)

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Efficient Workers

"Efficient workers must be helped to attain even greater efficiency. And these objectives must be gained by methods that are in harmony with the principles of a democratic society; they cannot be gained by commanding them; they must be gained by supplying incentives that will induce voluntary action."

S. D. Warren Company, a paper manufacturer, published a catalog of production-incentive posters in 1942, simultaneously supporting the cause and promoting their products.



(Photo, S.D. Warren Company,
Posters Used by American Industries
as War Production Incentives, 1942. 93-2129)

(Photo, b&w, S.D. Warren Company,
"The colorful poster campaign...", p. 6, 93-2127
Courtesy S.D. Warren Company.)

"Get Hot / Keep Moving"
(Unattributed. Poster, 163991.09,
28" x 40", 93-2318
Gift of S.D. Warren Company.)

"It's a Two Fisted Fight"
(Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corporation.

Poster, 164393.07, 31" x 41", 91-10320, 1942,
Gift of Fisher Body Division, General Motors Corporation.)

The government urged industry to organize "joint labor-management coordinating committees" to insure cooperation during the war. Often these were no more than "morale committees" that produced and distributed posters and organized bond rallies. But some teams went further, working together to resolve production problems and labor-management issues.

"Together We Can Do It"
(Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation, 1942
Poster, 164371.43, 30" x 40", 91-10322.
Gift of Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation.)

Posters called upon workers to conserve, keep their breaks short, and follow supervisors' instructions. Yet the main underlying goal was to convince workers, who still were nursing wounds from the violent labor conflicts of the 1930s, that they were no longer just employees of General Motors or United States Steel. Rather, they were Uncle Sam's "production soldiers" on the industrial front line.



"Wear It Proudly"
(Magill-Weinsheimer Company, 1942.
Poster, 303735.20, 28" x 38", 91-14113.
Gift of Peabody Museum.)

Labor management committees issued series of posters that addressed plant issues. Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, for example, encouraged women to participate fully in production.

"We Can Do It!"
(Artist: J. Howard Miller,
Westinghouse War Production Co-Ordinating Committee.
Poster, 1985.0851.05, 17" x 22", 87-13107)

However, another poster in the same series ("Ask Your Supervisor!") makes it clear that women and their fellow workers could take this empowerment only so far.

"Any Questions about York Work?
Ask Your Supervisor!"
(Artist: J. Howard Miller,
Westinghouse Labor-Management Co-Ordinating Committee.
Poster, 1985.0851.38, 17" x 22", 91-2543. Purchase.)

Factory walls and bulletin boards, series after series of posters directed employees to get to work --anything less was practically treason.

"Kiling Time Is Killing Men"
(Artist: Reynold Brown,
North American Aviation, 1943.
Poster, 164814.01, 32 1/2 x 42 1/2", 91-14114.
Gift of North American Aviation.)



(Photo/cover, Steel Horizons,
2 pp., spread, posters, 93-2128)

"We've never seen anything like it."
(Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corporation,
Steel Horizons, 1942,
On the "flood" of production incentive posters.
Courtesy National Process Company.)

With the onset of the war, company artists and art departments turned their talents from advertising to production-incentive posters. "Beat the promise" was the slogan of one of RCA's wartime worker-incentive campaigns. The "promise" refers to the company's established production quotas, which workers were urged to surpass. "Never Late Is Better", "Thanks for Loafing Pal," and "Don't Be a Bottleneck" were created by commercial artists using silk-screen techniques pioneered by the Works Progress Administration in the late 1930s.



"Don't Be a Bottleneck / Beat the Promise"
(Radio Corporation of America.
Poster, 164349.05, 18" x 22", 91-16238.
Gift of RCA Manufacturing Company.)

"Thanks for Loafing, Pal!"
(Walter Kidde & Company,
Poster, 164560.11, 17 x 23", 91-16239.
Gift of Walter Kidde & Company.)

"Never Late Is Better"
(Walter Kidde & Company
Poster, 164560.13, 17 x 23", 91-16240)

This image plays on the famous "Uncle Sam Wants You" figure on World War I recurring posters. Employers did not expect their work force to take all poster slogans literally. Rather, they may have used some of these posters to create an atmosphere of unity, urgency, and productivity.

"Are You Doing All You Can?"
(General Cable Corporation, 1942.
Poster, 164976.03, 22 x 28", 91-16242.
Gift of General Cable Corporation.)

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War Aims Through Art: The U.S. Office of War Information

To control the content and imagery of war messages, the government created the U.S. Office of War Information (OWI) in June 1942. Among its wide-ranging responsibilities, OWI sought to review and approve the design and content of government posters. Eventually, two contending groups within OWI clashed over poster design. Those who saw posters as "war art" favored stylized images and symbolism, while recruits from the world of advertising wanted posters to be more like ads. When admen gained the upper hand at OWI, the look of government posters changed decidedly.

OWI officials felt that the most urgent problem on the home front was the careless leaking of sensitive information that could be picked up by spies and saboteurs.

"The Sound That Kills"
(U.S. Office of War Information, Poster No. 1, 1942
Poster, 164595.03, 14 1/4 x 20", 91-16249.
Gift of Bureau of Publications and Graphics,
U.S. Office of War Information.)

OWI officials brought a variety of approaches to poster design. Graphics chief Francis Brennan, former art director of Fortune Magazine, believed that posters should be "war art", combining the sophisticated style of contemporary art with the promotion of war aims.



"Strong in the Strength of the Lord"
(Artist: David Stone Martin,

U.S. Office of War Information Poster No. 8, 1942
Poster, 164238.02, 22 x 28", 88-10638.
Gift of Bureau of Publications and Graphics,
U.S. Office of War Information.)

OWI drew some of its specialists from the world of advertising and commercial art, who tended to think in terms of "ad campaigns". The results were sometimes oddly superficial -- posters that translated messages ofd sacrifice and struggle into the familiar advertising world of smiling faces and carefree households.

"We'll Have Lots to Eat This Winter,
Won't We, Mother?"
(Artist: Al Parker, U.S. Office of War Information Poster No. 57.
Poster, 1984.0473.042, 16 x 22 1/2", 87-8757. Purchase.)

This image of a Nazi soldier failed to make its point, according to OWI's admen, who claimed that factory workers could not understand stylized images. The admen commissioned a survey of five factories in New Jersey, which reported that some workers thought that "he" was "the boss". Others thought the helmet was the Liberty Bell. Such surveys enabled OWI's admen to call for a more straightforward style of poster design.

"He's Watching You"
(Division of Information,
Office for Emergency Management, 1942.
Poster, 163677.01, 28 1/2 x 40", 91-10319.
Gift of War Department Bureau of Public Relations.)

OWI admen argued against stylized images on the grounds that they could be misinterpreted. A survey of

five New Jersey plants revealed that workers thought that this poster was about the FBI's war on crime. Instead of a workman holding a rivet gun, they saw a gangster holding a machine gun.

"Give 'em Both Barrels"
(Artist: Jean Carlu, Division of Information,
Office for Emergency Management, 1942.
Poster, 63958.01, 40 x 30", 91-13868.
Gift of Harris, Seybold, Potter Company.)

Advertising specialists in OWI finally gained the upper hand in 1943. From that time, government posters looked more like magazine illustrations, and the idea of "war art" was abandoned. OWI's admen now ran "information campaigns", using posters in concert with magazines, radio, and other kinds of paid advertising space.

"Help Bring Them Back to You!
...Make Yours a Victory Home!"
(Artist: Criss, U.S. Office of War Information
Poster No. 41, 1943
Poster, 1984.0473.039, 21 x 28". Purchase.)

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Fighting For An Ideal America

Whether created by government or by corporations, the production-incentive posters conveyed social, economic, and political ideas through imagery. Throughout the war, the imagery on such posters celebrated the middle-class home, the traditional nuclear family, consumerism, and free enterprise. Pictures of men and women conveyed assumptions about the roles of each in victory and offered a vision of life in an ideal postwar period.

The Sheldon-Claire Company, a Chicago ad agency, produced a series of wartime posters extolling an idealized America.

"This is America....where the family is a sacred institution..."
(Photo, 91-1541.
Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)

"This is America... smile, man, smile"
(Photograph by John Vachon. Photo 91-16227.
Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company)



"This is America...where Main Street is bigger than Broadway..."
(Photograph by Walker Evans, 91-2541.
Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)

"This is America...where a man picks his job"
(Photograph by Korth, 91-16226.
Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)

Poster images were very carefully created. Designers chose an "average Joe" to personify American workers, to gain the "common man's" allegiance to production goals. The average working woman, on the other hand, was often idealized as a fashion model in denim. This glamorized image was intended to convince women that they would not have to sacrifice their femininity for war work.



"Keep 'em Rolling, Pal...Produce for Victory"
(Photograph by Otto Hagel, 91-16246, 163799.03
24 x 36". Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)

"Man for Man...Produce for Victory!"
(Photograph courtesy Newsweek Magazine.
91-2748, 63799.15, 24 x 36".
Gift of Sheldon- Claire Company.)

War Imagery posed a problem for some retailers, who shied away from displaying blood-and-guts battle scenes in their windows. The Kroger Company turned instead to a fantasy of grim possibilities. This surrealistic image of schoolchildren in gas masks was another way of saying "It could happen here".

"Dear God, Keep Them Safe!"
(Kroger Grocery and Baking Company.
Poster, 164204.04, 48 x 36", 90-3773.
Gift of Kroger Grocery and Baking Company.)

"Don't Let Anything Happen to Them!"
(Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation
Poster, 164371.37, 30 x 40", 1942.
Gift of Oldsmobile Division, General Motors Corporation.)

"Make Today a Safe Day"
(Artist: J. Howard Miller,
Westinghouse Headquarters Industrial Relations
Poster, 1985.0851.26, 17 x 22, 91-2539. Purchase.)

Warning against inflation, the "Retail Activities Campaign" of the Office of Economic Stabilization encouraged women to avoid paying black-market prices for food and other items, as an added responsibility of homemaking.

"Make This Pledge"
(Attributed to U.S. Office of Economic Stabilization.
Poster, 1984.0473.068, 20 x 28 1/2",
91-2544. Purchase.)

With victory in sight, posters turned toward idealized images of the comforts and conveniences of life far from the factory scene.

"Despite War Restrictions, America's Living Standard...."
(Unattributed. Poster, 1989.0674, 20 x 27", 91-2454. Purchase.)

"This is America...a nation with more homes"
(Sheldon Claire Company.
Poster, 167134.05, 24 x 36", 91-2540.
Gift of Sheldon-Claire Company.)

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UNIFYING A NATION

World War II Posters from the New Hampshire State Library

LOOSE LIPS SINK SHIPS

Concerns about national security intensify during wartime. With German and Japanese submarines patrolling off U.S. coasts, great emphasis was placed on educating servicemen and civilians about the need for secrecy concerning military matters, especially troop movements. Central to maintaining national security was the Office of War Information's drive to limit talk about the war in both the public and private arenas of American life. Silence meant security. The graphic designs of this "loose talk" on the home front posters were usually strong and eye catching using bright colors for impact. In no other series of WWII posters was the potential for loss of human life portrayed as such a recurring theme.



Click on the image above or the title
at left for more information about each poster

The American Presidency Project

John T. Woolley & Gerhard Peters • University of California at Santa Barbara

return to original document

• Franklin D. Roosevelt

Executive Order 9182 Establishing the Office of War Information.

June 13th, 1942

In recognition of the right of the American people and of all other peoples opposing the Axis aggressors to be truthfully informed about the common war effort, and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution, by the First War Powers Act, 1941, and as President of the United States and Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy, it is hereby ordered as follows:

1. The following agencies, powers, and duties are transferred and consolidated into an Office of War Information which is hereby established within the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President:

(a) The Office of Facts and Figures and its powers and duties.

(b) The Office of Government Reports and its powers and duties.

(c) The powers and duties of the Coordinator of Information relating to the gathering of public information and its dissemination abroad, including, but not limited to, all powers and duties now assigned to the Foreign Information Service, Outpost, Publications, and Pictorial Branches of the Coordinator of Information.

(d) The powers and duties of the Division of Information of the Office for Emergency Management relating to the dissemination of general public information on the war effort, except as provided in paragraph 10.

2. At the head of the Office of War Information shall be a Director appointed by the President. The Director shall discharge and perform his functions and duties under the direction and supervision of the President. The Director may exercise his powers, authorities, and duties through such officials or agencies and in such manner as he may determine.

3, There is established within the Office of War Information a Committee on War Information Policy consisting of the Director as Chairman, representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, and of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, and such other members as the Director, with the approval of the President, may determine. The Committee on War Information Policy shall formulate basic policies and plans on war information, and shall advise with respect to the development of coordinated war information programs.

4. Consistent with the war information policies of the President and with the foreign policy of the United States, and after consultation with the Committee on War Information Policy, the Director shall perform the following functions and duties:

(a) Formulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding, at home and abroad, of the status and progress of the war effort and of the war policies, activities, and aims of the Government.

(b) Coordinate the war informational activities of all Federal departments and agencies for the purpose of assuring an accurate and consistent flow of war information to the public and the world at large.

(c) Obtain, study, and analyze information concerning the war effort and advise the agencies concerned with the dissemination of such information as to the most appropriate and effective means of keeping the public adequately and accurately informed.

(d) Review, clear, and approve all proposed radio and motion picture programs sponsored by Federal departments and agencies; and serve as the central point of clearance and contact for the radio broadcasting and motion-picture industries, respectively, in their relationships with Federal departments and agencies concerning such Government programs.

(e) Maintain liaison with the information agencies of the United Nations for the purpose of relating the Government's informational programs and facilities to those of such Nations.

(f) Perform such other functions and duties relating to war information as the President may from time to time determine.

5. The Director is authorized to issue such directives concerning war information as he may deem necessary or appropriate to carry out the purposes of this Order, and such directives shall be binding upon the several Federal departments and agencies. He may establish by regulation the types and classes of informational programs and releases which shall require clearance and approval by his office prior to dissemination. The Director may require the curtailment or elimination of any Federal information service, program, or release which he deems to be wasteful or not directly related to

the prosecution of the war effort.

6. The authority, functions, and duties of the Director shall not extend to the Western Hemisphere exclusive of the United States and Canada.

7. The formulation and carrying out of informational programs relating exclusively to the authorized activities of the several departments and agencies of the Government shall remain with such departments and agencies, but such informational programs shall conform to the policies formulated or approved by the Office of War Information. The several departments and agencies of the Government shall make available to the Director, upon his request, such information and data as may be necessary to the performance of his functions and duties.

8. The Director of the Office of War Information and the Director of Censorship shall collaborate in the performance of their respective functions for the purpose of facilitating the prompt and full dissemination of all available information which will not give aid to the enemy.

9. The Director of the Office of War Information and the Defense Communications Board shall collaborate in the performance of their respective functions for the purpose of facilitating the broadcast of war information to the peoples abroad.

10. The functions of the Division of Information of the Office for Emergency Management with respect to the provision of press and publication services relating to the specific activities of the constituent agencies of the Office for Emergency Management are transferred to those constituent agencies respectively, and the Division of Information is accordingly abolished.

11. Within the limits of such funds as may be made available to the Office of War Information, the Director may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services. He may provide for the internal management and organization of the Office of War Information in such manner as he may determine.

12. All records, contracts, and property (including office equipment) of the several agencies and all records, contracts, and property used primarily in the administration of any powers and duties transferred or consolidated by this Order, and all personnel used in the administration of such agencies, powers, and duties (including officers whose chief duties relate to such administration) are transferred to the Office of War Information, for use in the administration of the agencies, powers, and duties transferred or consolidated by this Order; provided, that any personnel transferred to the Office of War Information by this Order, found by the Director of the Office of War Information to be in excess of the personnel necessary for the administration of the powers and duties transferred to the Office of War Information, shall be retransfered under existing procedure to other positions in the Government service, or separated from the service.

13. So much of the unexpended balances of appropriations, allocations, or other funds available for the use of any agency in the exercise of any power or duty transferred or consolidated by this Order or for the use of the head of any agency in the exercise of any power or duty so transferred or consolidated, as the Director of the Bureau of the Budget with the approval of the President shall determine, shall be transferred to the Office of War Information, for use in connection with the exercise of powers or duties so transferred or consolidated. In determining the amount to be transferred, the Director of the Bureau of the Budget may include an amount to provide for the liquidation of obligations incurred against such appropriations, allocations, or other funds prior to the transfer or consolidation.

Citation: John T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters, *The American Presidency Project* [online]. Santa Barbara, CA: University of California (hosted), Gerhard Peters (database). Available from World Wide Web: (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=16273).

United States Office of War Information

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from OWI)

The **United States Office of War Information (OWI)** was a U.S. government agency created during World War II to consolidate government information services. It operated from June 1942 until September 1945. It coordinated the release of war news for domestic use, and, using posters and radio broadcasts, worked to promote patriotism, warned about foreign spies and attempted to recruit women into war work. The office also established an overseas branch which launched a large scale information and propaganda campaign abroad.

The OWI was established by Executive Order 9182 (http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=16273) on June 13, 1942, to consolidate the functions of the Office of Facts and Figures, OWI's direct predecessor; the Office of Government Reports, and the division of information of the Office for Emergency Management. The Foreign Intelligence Service, Outpost, Publication, and Pictorial Branches of the Office of the Coordinator of Information were also transferred to the OWI. (The Executive order creating OWI, however, stated that dissemination of information to the Latin American countries should be continued by the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.) Elmer Davis, who was a CBS newsman, was named director of OWI.

Among its wide-ranging responsibilities, OWI sought to review and approve the design and content of government posters. OWI officials felt that the most urgent problem on the home front was the careless leaking of sensitive information that could be picked up by spies and saboteurs.

OWI directly produced radio series such as *This is Our Enemy* (spring 1942), which dealt with Germany, Japan, and Italy; *Uncle Sam*, which dealt with domestic themes; and *Hasten the Day* (August 1943), which was about the Home Front. In addition, OWI cleared commercial network scripts through its Domestic Radio Bureau, including the NBC Blue Network's *Chaplain Jim*. In addition, radio producer Norman Corwin produced several series for OWI, including *An American in England*, *An American in Russia*, and *Passport for Adams*, which starred actor Robert Young.

In addition, the OWI produced a series of 267 newsreels in 16 mm film, *The United Newsreel* which were shown overseas and to U.S. audiences. These newsreels incorporated U.S. military footage. Examples can be seen at this Google list (http://video.google.com/videosearch?q=owner%3Anara+type%3Aworld_war_II&so=0) .

OWI also established the Voice of America in 1942, which remains in service today as the official government broadcasting service of the United States. The VOA's initial transmitters were loaned from the commercial networks, and among the programs OWI produced were those provided by the Labor Short Wave Bureau, whose material came from the American Federation of Labor and the Congress of Industrial Organizations.

During 1942 and 1943, the OWI contained two photographic units whose photographers documented the country's mobilization during the early years of the war, concentrating on such topics as aircraft factories and women in the workforce.

Among the many people who worked for the OWI were Humphrey Cobb, Milton S. Eisenhower, Howard

Fast, Alan Cranston, Jane Jacobs, Alexander Hammid, Lewis Wade Jones, Murray Leinster, Archibald MacLeish, Charles Olson, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., William Stephenson, James Reston, Waldo Salt, Philip Keeney, Irving Lerner, Peter Rhodes, Christina Krotkova, Gordon Parks, Lee Falk and Flora Wovschin. Many of these people were active supporters of President Roosevelt's New Deal and extolled the President's policies in producing radio programs such as *This is War*, which irritated Congressional opponents of such programs. In addition, many of the writers, producers, and actors of OWI programs admired the Soviet Union and were either loosely affiliated with or were members of the Communist Party USA. In his final report, Elmer Davis noted that he had fired 35 employees because of past Communist associations, though the FBI files showed no formal allegiance to the CPUSA.

Congressional opposition to the domestic operations of the OWI resulted in increasingly curtailed funds. In 1943, the OWI's appropriations were cut out of the fiscal year 1944 budget and only restored with strict restrictions on what OWI could do domestically. Many branch offices were closed and the Motion Picture Bureau was closed down. By 1944 the OWI operated mostly in the foreign field, contributing to undermining enemy morale. The agency was abolished in 1945, and its foreign functions were transferred to the Department of State.

The OWI was terminated, effective September 15, 1945, by an executive order of August 31, 1945.

References

- Allan Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information, 1942-1945* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978)
- Howard Blue, *Words at War: World War II Radio Drama and the Postwar Broadcast Industry Blacklist* (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2002). ISBN 0-8108-4413-3.

External links

- OWI recordings at the Library of Congress (http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/awhhtml/awrs9/owi.html)
- Images from the Farm Security Administration-Office of War Information Collection (http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/fsowhome.html) (Library of Congress)
- National Archives and Records Administration (http://www.archives.gov/research/guide-fed-records/groups/208.html)
- War Aims Through Art (http://www.hrw.com/si/social/si_1914/si_ww2posters/victory5.htm) (posters)
- World War II OWI posters (http://americanhistory.si.edu/victory/victory5.htm)
- World War Poster Collection (http://digital.library.unt.edu/browse/collection/wwpc/) hosted by the Universtity of North Texas Libraries' Digital Collections (http://digital.library.unt.edu/)

Categories: Defunct agencies of the United States government | United States government propaganda organisations | World War II politics

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Rosie the Riveter

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Rosie the Riveter

Rosie the Riveter, fictional, symbolic poster character during World War II, part of the United States government's publicity campaign to encourage women to join the workforce from 1942 to 1945. Before the war, most middle- and upper-class American women stayed home and took care of the house and children. As men began leaving for the war, their jobs became vacant. In addition, other jobs were created as the war increased demand for such products as food, clothing, and munitions. Women were needed to fill the vacant jobs, and Rosie the Riveter was created in 1942 to enlist them.

Rosie the Riveter was depicted as an attractive, rosy-cheeked woman dressed in work clothes, designed to make the idea of working outside the home attractive and comfortable. She made it seem patriotic rather than unfeminine to work outside the home. With the help of the Rosie the Riveter publicity campaign, more than 6 million women joined the workforce during the war. After the war ended in 1945, most of these women lost their jobs to the returning male workforce. However, working outside the home became more acceptable for middle-class women.

Motion Pictures and Propaganda

On April 21, 1898-the day the United States Congress declared war against Spain-two New York City motion picture entrepreneurs sat in their office looking down upon the jubilant crowds filling the city streets, waving the American flag, and shouting nationalistic slogans. The two men realized their country was ready for a strong dose of instant patriotism. Within a few hours, the entrepreneurs assembled a film crew and hacked out a one-reel film entitled *Tearing Down the Spanish Flag.* Soon, thousands of New Yorkers sat in makeshift theaters at vaudeville houses, watching Vitagraph Company's version of the seizure of a Spanish government installation in Havana by U.S. Army troops-an event that was, historically, many weeks away. For the viewers, the fact that the film was entirely fictitious did not matter. Through the flickering images, moviegoers fulfilled their desires for adventure and victory, and rejoyced in the military prowess of the United States. Thus began the relationship of motion pictures and propaganda. (1)

During the early years of the twentieth century, the motion picture industry slowly developed new techniques and skill. By 1917, the year the United States entered the Great War in Europe, the industry had reached a level of sophistication. 1917 saw the beginning of a barrage of anti-German, propagandistic films. Cecil B. De Mille produced *Joan the Woman,The Little American,* and *Till I Come Back to You*-all of which depicted the Huns as barbaric,uncivilized, and depraved men who only wanted to violate America's sweetheart, Mary Pickford. Other studios and directors followed suit. When World War II ended in November, 1918, American moviegoers had seen dozens of silent films justifying the United States' intervention in the global conflict. Audiences had cheered in unison as they watched reel after reel of American doughboys defeating the Germans, and had lived vicariously their nation's great triumph.

portray enemies as idiots

Throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s, the motion picture industry grew by leaps and bounds. War folms were replaced with westerns, comedies, adventures-escapist entertainment for a nation faced with ever-growing economic depression. As times grew harder, movies became more popular, offering a relatively inexpensive way to forget one's troubles. In the 1930s, more than 80 million people a week went to the movies to see their favorite stars in an escapist role. Gradually, some films depicting a more somber view of WWI emerged, such as *All Quiet On the Western Front*. For the most

part, however, propaganda and war films remained virtually absent from the screen during the inter-war period. America's love afair with Hollywood grew, and movie stars became idols. This was the era of lavish film epics, like *Gone With the Wind*.

Original movie poster from *Gone With the Wind*(2)

Moviegoers outside a theater in Washington D.C., 1939 (3)
Library of Congress digital ID fsa8a31535

With the start of the 1940s, the war in Europe drew ever nearer to American shores. Try as it might to perpetuate the escapist fantasy of the 1930s, Hollywood grew ever more awaare of the impending conflict. It became time for Hollywood to once again take up the propagandist role. A few propaganda films began to inch onto the screens, taking potshots at the old German nemisis. These early attempts invoked the wrath of congressional isolationists. On September 9, 1941, a battle began between the best talent in Hollywood and the U.S. Senate as isolationists sought to curb the interventionalist tone Hollywood had begun to take. The hearings adjourned after three weeks, but the debate about what role Hollywood should play in propaganda continued. In October of 1941, Senate Resolution 152 was enacted, calling for thourough and complete investigation of any film propaganda.

The debate ended on December 7, 1941, with the bombing of Pearl Harbor. Following the Pearl Harbor attack, the U.S. entered a period of massive homefront mobilization. This mobilization effort permeated all aspects of American society, from industry to entertainment. President Roosevelt cited Hollywood for its role during the wartime period, claiming that the motion picture was the most effective medium to inform the nation. By June of 1942, the Office of War Information had become the official guardian of the film industry, supervising the Hollywood propaganda machine. Studios churned out countless movies glorifying the war, the men who served in it, and the American homefront which supported them. At the same time, other films reminded the

moviegoer of what the fighting was for: the preservation of American culture and history. Hollywood stars set examples, joined the services and went on USO tours, sold bonds, and promoted scrap drives. When World War II ended, the film industry could congradulate itself for a job well done. Hollywood went to war for the mobilization effort, and returned victorious.

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Office of War Information

For the benefit of both your studio and the Office of War Information it would be advisable to establish a routine procedure whereby our Hollywood office would recieve copies of studio treatments or synopses of all stories which you contemplate producing and of the finished scripts. This will enable us to make suggestions as to the war content of motion pictures at a stage when it is easy and inexpensive to make any changes which might be recommended.

-Lowell Mellett (FDR presidential liaison to media) to studio heads, December 9, 1942 (4)

The Office of War Information (OWI) was one of the numerous government bureaucracies created by the total mobilization effort of the Victory Program. On June 13, 1942, the White House announced the creation of the OWI and the appointment of its chief, Elmer Davis. OWI was to undertake campaigns to enhance public understanding of the war at home and abroad; to coordinate government information activities; and to handle liaison with the press, radio, and motion pictures. In effect, the OWI was charged with selling the war. The agency issued elaborate guidelines, divided into numerous categories, to insure conformity in every film. OWI asked film makers to consider the following seven questions before producing a movie:

- **Will this picture help win the war?**
- **What war information problem does it seek to clarify, dramatize, or interpret?**
- **If it is an "escape" picture, will it harm the war effort by creating a false picture of America, her allies, or the world we live in?**
- **Does it merely use the war as the basis for a profitable picture, contributing nothing of real significance to the war effort and possibly lessening the effect of other pictures of more importance?**
- **Does it contribute something new to our understanding of the world conflict and the various forces involved, or has the subject already been adequately covered?**
- **When the picture reaches its maximum circulation on the screen, will it reflect conditions as they are and fill a need current at that time, or will it be out-dated?**
- **Does the picture tell the truth or will the young people of today have reason to say they were misled by propaganda? (7)**

This last question was, at first, a consideration of extreme importance for OWI. The agency, which was often classified as "liberal" by other branches of the government, started out with the intention of truthfully representing the war. Films like *Casablanca* genuinely attempted to inform the moviegoing audience of

the causes of and reasons for the war. The OWI sought to avoid hate pictures, providing instead a balanced view. These good intentions quickly dissolved, though, as the OWI found it necessary to crack down on the motion picture industry. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor, Hollywood turned out numerous anti-Japanese films, some of them quite racist. Particularly, the mid-summer 1942 *Little Tokyo, U.S.A.*,which dealt with the controversial subject of Japanese internment, caused the OWI to crack down on the artistic license of Hollywood. As the OWI became more regulatory, truthfulness gave way to the use of sentimental symbolism to manipulate opinion by denying or clouding relevant information. By the end of World War II, the OWI had a heavy hand in all production coming out of Hollywood.

Click here to view the OWI photo collection from the Library of Congress

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The Battle Ground

The first year of America's involvement in World War II constituted a period of almost unrelieved bad news. Allied outposts in the South Pacific fell, the Nazis pushed toward Stalingrad, and the Suez Canal was threatened. What victories did occur, such as the defensive victory at Midway, carry more importance in retrospect than they did during 1942. A year of bad news left the American public fearing that, perhaps, "we could have lost that war, and were within inches of losing it..." (6) The grim atmosphere of 1942 caused the OWI to take "Will this picture help the war?" quite seriously. Every act seemed to carry great importance for the war. OWI decided that drastic measures were needed to bring Hollywood in line with the agency's propaganda program.

The tightened control of the motion picture industry resulted in an outpouring of films about war. Hollywood produced numerous battle films dealing directly with the conflict, in an effort to offset the ominous events following Pearl Harbor. These films offered the same theme: as in World War I, the Yanks were coming. The early battles were lost, but final victory would belong to America. Film after film pictured Americans routing their enemies and liberating enslaved nations. The general victory motif included themes on military strength, heroism, and Allied cooperation. While many of these war films were turkeys, some represent World War II Hollywood at its best. Films like *Sahara, Bataan, Flying Tigers, Guadalcanal Diary,* and *Wake Island* represent not only the best of Hollywood's persuasive skills, but also classic cinema.

Humphrey Bogart confers with British officer in *Sahara.* (7)

These films filled a void left by the depressing news from the fronts. Later, when the tides turned toward victory, the battle-film genre served to glorify American military spirit. But what about the issues facing the home front? The fact that, by the final phase of World War II, less than one-third of all films were directly connected to the war indicates that Hollywood did not spend the entire war period shooting down Japanese planes and exploding Nazi tanks. Hollywood turned to different genres: the comedy, musical, and nostalgia films. However, these films served just as much propaganda purpose as did the battle films.

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Morale Films: Courage, Comedy, and American Nostalgia

While American soldiers were off fighting the Axis powers in faraway places, civilians at home found their normal way of life completely altered. Consumer goods became limited as rationing went into effect: crude oil, rubber, butter, meat, canned goods, clothing and shoes were all in short supply. Unacustomed to such constraits, Americans chaffed under the restrictions of home front mobilization. The one place where the public could still spend its money freely was at the movies. The OWI recognized the discontent of the average American, and sought to counterbalance this mobilization effect with entertainment. OWI enlisted the help of Hollywood to bolster the morale of the American public. Hollywood responded with enthusiasm-if there was one subjrect Hollywood producers thought they knew, it was America. The Hollywood propaganda machine pured out countless morale films, in an effort to sustain spirits on the home front. Stuios produced upbeat stories with happy endings about people who were beautiful, witty, and successful, but not so far removed from a middle class norm as to make it difficult for audiences to identify with the actors. The films presented an idealized version of American society, glorifying the average citizen who made personal sacrifices for the war effort. Hollywood and the OWI found that they could use similar sacred and sentimental symbols in the propaganda effort.

Many of the films of the war period dealt directly with issues facing the home front. *Joe Smith, American* lauded the everyday virtues of an ordinary assembly-line factory worker...who is captured and tortured by Nazi agents, but stoicly refuses to answer their questions about American the armaments industry. In *Saboteur*, yet another factory worker thwarts the Nazi foe. *Pittsburgh* extolled the importance of the steel works industry.

In addition to praising the virtues and importance of the factory workers, Hollywood attempted to bolster the courage of the American people by depicting the integrity and fortitude of the average citizen dealing with homefront constraints. One of the most popular vehicles for this theme was that of the trials and tribulations of American women left at home. *Tender Comrade* dramatized the daily existence of five working women sharing joy, sorrow, shortage, and an apartment, while their men were at war. *Since You Went Away* (original movie poster above right, 8) attempted the same on a more upper-class level, but got bogged down in subplots and kitsch.



Hollywood also sought to alleviate the pressures of the war effort through comedy and dance spectaculars. There were some lighthearted moments on the homefront when large groups of Americans gathered to sing popular tunes and dance fancy steps, while making derogatory remarks about Hitler, Mussolini, and Tojo. By V-J Day, over seventy-five war period musicals had been released. As a genre, musicals surpassed every other film category during the war period. Some, like *Stage Door Canteen* and *Hollywood Canteen* made attempts to deal directly with the war situation. Others, such as *Holiday Inn*, ignored the conflict, prefering instead to devote its time to song-and-dance numbers. *Yankee Doodle Dandy*(at left, 9) presented an elaborate diorama of American patriotism: musical numbers covered everything from the American Revolution to George M. Cohan's WWI classic, "Over There".

One of the most surprising outputs of the WWII propaganda machine was the film genre of American nostalgia. These films, which had no direct relation to the war itself, subtly reminded the American moviegoer why the war was being fought. These films fondly looked upon eras of American history and culture. Films such as *Meet Me In St. Louis* and *Life With Father* depicted turn-of-the century America. Ironically, these films represent some of the best Hollywood propaganda. The American public unknowingly absorbed the message that they must continue to make personal sacrifices for the war effort, in order to preserve the innocent and idealogical American society portrayed on the screen.

Original movie poster, Meet Me In St. Louis (10); William Powell and Irene Dunne in Life With Father (11)

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The Stars Go to War

The Hollywood propaganda machine did not limit itself to turning out films for the war effort. Hollywood stars literally joined up, enlisting in the armed services and touring with the USO. Whether for publicity, or out of a genuine desire to contribute to the war effort, Hollywood personalities fought, sang, and danced their way across the war fronts, bolstering the spirits of the American service men and civilians.

The most popular service for the stars to join was the Air Force-perhaps the theatrics and drama of flying appealed to those accustomed to life on the screen. Although he was technically too old for the draft, Clark Gable joined up and became a Major. Cable flew missions over Europe in B-17s to obtain combat footage, although he was neither required nor expected to do so. James Stewart flew combat missions for the Air Force in both B-17 and B-24 bombers. Stewart was recognized for his leadership during a raid on German aircraft factories, and was awarded many medals, including the Distinguished Flying Cross,at left (12), and the French Palme de Guerre. After World War II, Stewart continued to serve in the reserves, eventually becoming a Brigadier General. At a memorial service held after Stewart's death, the Air Force praised the actor, calling him the "embodiment of the citizen-warrior."(14)

Clark Gable (center) on return from a combat mission over Nazi Europe, 1943 (13)

The USO was formed in response to a 1941 request from President Roosevelt. FDR determined that it would be best if private organizations handled the on-leave entertainment for the rapidly expanding Armed Services. By 1944, the USO ran over 3,000 clubs. Hollywood stars took to serving and entertaining service men at these clubs, an activity which became the focus of many films (*Hollywood Canteen, Stage Door Canteen*). The USO truely made history with its campaign to entertain the troops on the front, the traveling camp shows. Between 1941 and 1947, the USO put on 428,521 shows for the members of the armed forces. Here the role of the Hollywood celebrity was indispensible. Hollywood stars provided entertainment and escape, in an effort to sustain the morale of troops stationed on the front lines. Hollywood's jokester,

Bob Hope, became one of the most influential propaganda figures of the war effort through his participation in the USO camp shows.

Bob and Dolores Hope on break from a USO performance, WWII (15)

Bing Crosby sings to troops at the London stage door canteen (16)

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Hollywood Homefront Mobilization

During World War II, the U.S. goverment sought to capitalize upon America's love affair with the movies. Movie stars have been idolized by American culture since the first films flickered across the screens. The Hollywood propaganda machine recognized this obsession, and put it to use for the mobilization effort.

Hollywood became an integral part of the home front. Many stars engaged in publicity tours to sell war bonds, promote scrap drives, or serve coffe at USO clubs. Hollywood celebrities became the most effective salesmen for the home front war effort. Stars provided an example for the average American to live up to-if glamerous Betty Grable could give up her stockings, Betty Smith could do the same.

Miss Ohara takes time out from the studio to help with a typewritter drive for the Armed Forces
NAIL image NLR-PHOCO-66287(19) (23)

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Selective Filmography

- *Casablanca*
- *Little Tokyo, U.S.A.*
- *Flying Tigers*
- *Tender Comrade*
- *Holiday Inn*

Casablanca

- Warner Brothers, released November 27, 1942.

Casablanca is one of the best films produced by the World War II Hollywood propaganda machine. One of the early war films, it represents the OWI's early intentions of truthfully representing the war and educating the moviegoer about the issues surrounding the conflict. The film addresses the intricacies of the Berlin-Vichy situation, and makes subtle references to Spain and Ethiopia. While the film often gets bogged down in it's attempts to accurately depict the war (did the average viewer truely understand the numerous allusions to the complicated issues of Ethiopia and Vichy France?), it is not lacking in propaganda.

Casablanca
movie poster (17)

Casablanca glorifies the heroism of the resistance movement. Humphrey Bogart stars as Rick, the tough, cynical owner of a glamerous nightclub in "neutral" Morocco, where thousands of refugees have fled Nazi brutality. Behind Bogart's cynical exterior is a man who used to care. Throughout the course of the film, Rick reveals that he has fought fascists in Ethiopia and Spain, and fled Paris in the face of German occupation. As the plot develops, Rick softens to the resistance cause once again, although he has asserted that he sticks his head out for no one. He eventually helps Victor Laszlo (Paul Henreid), the head of the Czechoslovakian resistance movement and the husband of Rick's former lover Ilsa (Ingrid Bergman), escape capture. Rick heroically sacrifices his chance to be reunited with Ilsa, giving Laszlo the two exit visas intended for Rick and Ilsa.

While the propaganda is much more subtle in *Casablanca* than in later war films, it is none the less prevelant. In one scene, the French refugees in Rick's bar sing "La Marseillaise" in defiance to the German soldiers singing "Horst Wessel". Rick's cynicism is due to broken love

(not lack of political commitment), he stoicly forfeits a renewed chance at love, sacrificing his personal happiness for the resistance cause. The message is clear: resistance to the Axis powers is more important than personal happiness. In aiding the movement, Rick too becomes a hero. So shall the average citizen who puts the war effort ahead of his own interests.

Casablanca movie poster (17)

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Little Tokyo, U.S.A.

- Twentieth Century-Fox, released July 8, 1942

Little Tokyo, U.S.A. became a milestone in the relationship between OWI and Hollywood as a result of its treatment of war themes. Twentieth Century-Fox siezed on one of the most contoversial aspects of the homefront, the roundup and internment of people of Japanese descent on the West Coast. *Little Tokyo* basically developed the theme that anyone of Japanese descent, including American citizens, was loyal to the emperor of Japan and a potential traitor to America.

The movie employed a quasi-documentary style of filming. Twentieth Century sent its cameramen to the Japanese quarter of Los Angeles to shoot the actual evacuation. However, after the evacuation, night shots were difficult in the deserted "Little Tokyo". Night scenes were filmed in Chinatown, instead-who would notice that the street signs had Chinese instead of Japanese characters? This assumption carried over to casting: Chinese actor Richard Loo played one of the lead Japanese roles in the film.

Little Tokyo took its tone from Martin Dies, chairman of the Special Committee of the House on Un-American Activities. Dies charged that 15,000 Japanese nationals were involved in espionage against the United States. As the hero "Mike Steele" attempts to investigate a murder in "Little Tokyo" (image above right, 18), he constantly encounters oppostion from the Japanese community, who are secretly planing to aid a Japanese invasion of the west coast. The message of the film is clear: the Japanese-American community is a single, unified body which works together at all times for itself and against America. (19)

Little Tokyo, U.S.A. was condemned by OWI as an "invitation to the Witch Hunt", preaching hate for all people of Japanese descent. After the *Little Tokyo* episode, OWI

took a much more active role in the regulation of Hollywood propaganda. It is ironic that an effort to protest Japanese-American's civil rights prompted OWI to impose stricter censorship. OWI stepped up its demands that the studios submit screenplays to it before shooting began, and began to enlist the help of the Office of Censorship.

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Flying Tigers

- Republic, released September 23, 1942

Flying Tigers epitomizes the blast-them-from-the-skies genre of wartime films. The film depicts the heroic exploits of an American volunteer group-the Flying Tigers-who openly fought the Japanese long before war in the Pacific was declared. The film opened in September of 1942, at a time when the war news from the Pacific was dismal and uncertain. *Flying Tigers* provided the thrills necessary to sustain and improve morale on the home front.

John Wayne and John Carroll in *Flying Tigers*(20)

In addition to boosting home front spirits with thrilling scenes, Flying Tigers emphasizes that team effort is paramount in war time. The film also praises the Chinese people, who are being mercilessly attacket by the savage Japanese. Flying Tigers is a prototypical example of Hollywood propaganda, glorifying the skills of the American armed services, and praising heroism, unity, and all who resist Axis domination.

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Tender Comrade

- RKO, released December 29, 1943

Tender Comrade is a World War II soap opera, staring Ginger Rogers and Robert Ryan as high school sweethearts who marry but are seperated when Ryan enters the Army at the start of the war. Rogers soon finds herself sharing an apartment with four other working women who have been left alone, their men having gone off to war (image

bellow left, 21).

The film was produced under tight supervision by the OWI. *Tender Comrade* represents Hollywood's (and the OWI's) glorification of the everday sacrifices of the American home front. The women encounter rationing, shortages, hoarding, the black market, and opportunism-issue which threatened the domestic mobilization effort. Rogers remarks to her roommates: "...I think anyone who hoards is a heel.", and the women berate a local butcher for showing favoritism to certain customers by ignoring rationing laws. The message of the film is clear: black marketeers and hoarders took their orders from Berlin.

Rogers' character gives birth in the film, but the joy of her son is short-lived, as news of her husband's death reaches the house. The stoic widow cradles her infant, reaffirming that his father's sacrifice had helped protect freedom for all Americans. *Tender Comrade* farily drips with propaganda and patriotism. The film provided an example for all American women to live up to: it Ginger Rogers could ration her food and cope with her husband's death, they should be willing and able to act similarly.

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Holiday Inn

- Paramount, released 1942

At first glance, *Holiday Inn* may not appear to be an outgrowth of the Hollywood propaganda machine. The film in no way deals with the issue of the war. The rather loose plot revolves around the purchase of an old inn, set out in the country-side. Bing Crosby intends to fix up the place and use it as a "holiday inn", with themed shows revolving around the different seasons (enter Fred Asraire and Marjorie Reynolds). *Holiday Inn* is simply an excuse for elaborate song-and-dance numbers. Some of the most famous Hollywood routines, including Fred Astaire's firecracker dance, are found in the film. "White Christmas", the most famous song to ever come out of a movie, is featured in *Holiday Inn* ("White Christmas" won the 1942 Academy Award for best song).

Bing Crosby and Marjorie Reynolds (22)

While the film does not deal directly with World War II, *Holiday Inn* still represents Hollywood's effort for the war movement. The film served contradictory purposes. On the one hand, the song-and-dance routines were intended to take the audiences' minds off of the hardships and sorrow of war. At the same time, the film relied hevily upon American iconograghy. Hollywood used this patriotic imagry to subtley remind the moviegoers why we fought: for the preservation of the innocent, democratic American way of life.

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The world was at war. Resources of all kinds were being diverted to support national war efforts. Countries asked their citizens to help in every way that they could.

People dutifully funded the war by purchasing bonds, they conserved raw materials, they recycled, they rallied behind the troops, they helped their neighbors, they gave their lives, and they planted "***Gardens for Victory***".

Victory Gardens came in every shape and size. Governments and corporations promoted this call for self-reliance. People in all areas, rural and urban alike, worked the soil to raise food for their families, friends, and neighbors. Victory gardening enabled more supplies to be shipped to our troops around the world.

[Click Here for Memories of WW II Victory Gardeners]

These concepts are very foreign to us in our post-war, global economy. For years we have been bombarded by marketing messages of consumerism, reliance on others, and have experienced nearly constant economic growth. A whole generation of young people know it no other way. As our population ages, we are losing the experiences and knowledge of the Great Depression and WW II from our society's psyche.

History is cyclical, the strong economy of the 1980s and 1990s has begun to weaken, and there are lessons to be learned from the past. It is always a good time to plant your own "***Victory Garden***".

★ Learn More About W.W. II-era Victory Gardening in America ★

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It was a different time. The world had experienced many years of economic hardships and now people were being asked to give up more. The propaganda machine was geared up to make sure that everyone on the homefront did their part to aide in the effort. The messages were simple, symbolic, and very patriotic.

Although canned foods were rationed items, there were relatively few food shortages in W.W. II-era America. The call to plant a Victory Garden was answered by nearly 20 million Americans. These gardens produced up to 40% of all that was consumed.

The National Archives

Title: "Groundwork for Victory: Grow More in '44"

Artist: Norman Kenyon
Creating Organization: Office of Government Reports. United States Information Service. Division of Public Inquiry. Bureau of Special Services, OWI

Title: "Plant A Victory Garden: Our Food Is Fighting"

Artist: Robert Gwathney
Creating Organization: Office of Government Reports. United States Information Service. Division of Public Inquiry. Bureau of Special Services, OWI
Size: 28 x 22 inches
Subject: Family at the task of "Victory Gardening"

The National Archives

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* Tell a Friend!

Heirloom Tomatoes | CLASSICS | Victory Horticultural Library | NostlagiaGum.com

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Many of the public service booklets provided very similar information. They were published by Hearst (Good Housekeeping), International Harvester, Beech-nut Packing Company, Simon & Schuster (House & Garden Magazine), seed companies, and the government, among others.

They taught the basics of gardening. The audience was assumed as having no knowledge and the material was presented as such. Topics included soil health, how to plant, when to plant, how to tend plants, pest identification, and even suggestions on what to plant.

The basic produce types commonly suggested were:

Beans	**Corn**
Beets	**Parsnips**
Carrots	**Leeks**
Peas	**Turnips**
Radishes	**Cabbage**
Lettuce	**Brussels Sprouts**
Spinach	**Broccoli**
Chard	**Peppers**
Onions	**Cauliflower**
Cucumbers	**Tomatoes**
Parsley	**Eggplant**
Kohlrabi	**Endive**
Summer Squash	**Rutabagas**

Click Here for Victory Garden Seed Packet Purchasing Information

Emphasis was placed on making gardening a family or community effort - not a drudgery, but a pastime, and a national duty. There is truth and lessons to be learned in our history.

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Victory Garden

The Museum closed on September 5, 2006 for major architectural renovations and is scheduled to reopen by fall 2008.

Stay in touch! Subscribe to our monthly e-mail newsletter.

The Victory Garden is an outdoor garden produced in conjunction with the *Within These Walls...* exhibition at the National Museum of American History, Behring Center. Using a design from a 1943 pamphlet, the Horticulture Services Division of the Smithsonian Institution is re-creating a World War II victory garden on the terrace outside the Museum's cafeteria. The 130-foot long garden contains over fifty varieties of vegetables and flowers that change with the seasons. The vegetables are heirloom species, older varieties that were available to gardeners during the 1940s.

Each plant has a different growing season, so you'll see different species in the garden at different times of the year.

What Is a Victory Garden?

Victory gardens were vegetable gardens planted during the world wars to ensure an adequate food supply for civilians and troops. Government agencies, private foundations, businesses, schools, and seed companies all worked together to provide land, instruction, and seeds for individuals and communities to grow food.

From California to Florida, Americans plowed backyards, vacant lots, parks, baseball fields, and schoolyards to set out gardens. Children and adults fertilized, planted, weeded, and watered in order to harvest an abundance of vegetables.

Colorful posters and regular feature articles in newspapers and magazines helped to get the word out and encouraged people to stick with it. The goal was to produce enough fresh vegetables through the summer for the immediate family and neighbors. Any excess produce was canned and preserved for the winter and early spring until next year's victory garden produce was ripe.

Throughout the World War II years, millions of



Illustration of Smithsonian Victory Garden by Walter Howell

Can you find any of these plants? (See drawing above--click to enlarge)

- Red Cored carrot
- Tennis Ball lettuce
- Moon and Stars watermelon
- Telephone peas

did you know...?

Victory garden pamphlet, 1944, and home canning equipment, mid-1900s

...that during World War II, nearly 20 million Americans planted victory gardens? Their efforts growing and preserving their own food saved the nation's war products for the armed forces and Allies. Ipswich resident Mary Scott was among the millions of American women who used home canning equipment to preserve fruits and vegetables from her garden.

victory gardens in all shapes and sizes--from window boxes to community plots--produced abundant food for the folks at home. While the gardens themselves are now gone, posters, seed packets and catalogs, booklets, photos and films, newspaper articles and diaries, and people's memories still remain to tell us the story of victory gardens.

World War II victory garden poster, Office of War Information, 1943

Our Family Remembers

Whether they fought in the military or used ration coupons to buy food, everyone participated in the war effort. Ask your family members and older adult friends what they remember about World War II and the home front.

Learn more about victory gardens.

Learn more about Mary Scott, who lived in the house featured in the *Within These Walls...* exhibition and planted a victory garden in her yard during World War II.

View the kitchen where Mary Scott preserved vegetables grown in her victory garden during the war.

Learn more about the Smithsonian's victory garden.



Trailer park victory garden, early 1940s

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